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The terminator syndrome: Science fíction, cinema and contemporary culture. ' ... th e m yth o f th e m a n -m ach in e is th e U r-te x t o f th e la te tw en tieth cen tu ry (M ark D ery) A b stra c t
T h is p a p e r exa m in es the im p a ct o f com em porary technology on representations o f the h u m a n bo d y in A m e ric a n p o p u la r culture, fo c u sin g on Ja m es C a m ero n 's science fic tio n film s T h e T erm in a to r (1984) a n d T h e T erm inator I I -J u d ffn e n t D ay (I 9 9 I) in both o f which the key figures are cybem etic organism s (cyborgs) o r a robot w hich can exactly im ita te the h u m a n fo r m . T he p a p er argues th a t th e ability o f m o d e m film technology' to represent the h u m a n fo rtn in robotic guise undercuts th e distinction between nature a n d culture w hich m aintains the position o f the h u m a n being in society. T he ability o f the robot o r cyborg to b e *polygendered\ in particular, underm ines th e po sitio n o f a properly o ed ipalized h u m a n b o d y in society, o n e w hich balances the instinctual life against the rule o f cultural law. A s a result the s e c o n d T erm inator film attem pts a recuperation o f the category o f the h u m a n by an oedipalization o f the term inator cyborg.

Monsters and the body
The body has long been considered a problem atic and productive them e in W estern art and know ledge; one which owes its central position in both trad itio n s to the range of crucial questions and values which it seems to implicate. W hile this range of questions would be difficult to represent in all its variety, in essence concern with the body regularly raises the question of the place and role of the corporeal in the spiritual or cultural, or what it is that both connects and differentiates human beings from other living things. In other words, thinking upon the body always seem s to act as a crucial indicator of the ways in which any given historical period (or philosophical position) conceives of the relationship between nature and culture.
W hile the content of this relationship has not always been thought in the same terms, it is clear that in any given culture a normalized conception of the body depends on a stable and differential relation of nature/culture, which is necessarily underm ined by any alternative 13 bodily form. Before the advent o f the technological age (which introduces the first truly radical alternative body -the robot) the possibility of alternatives to the human body found dramatic enactment in the fascination with monstrosity.
The study of monsters, or teratology, reveals a complex variety of horrible and enchanting creatures, but it is nevertheless possible to distinguish betw een two kinds of monsters -the unique and singular, emphatically non-hum an or literal m onster such as the dragon -and the kind of m onsters which concern this p a p er -those which are a com bination of the human and the non-human.
Early forms of monsters in this tradition include those which display alternative forms or distortions of an essentially hum an body (such as the races of savage m en whose heads grow below their shoulders, inhabiting the outer rim o f the world, or desert dwellers with one large foot for protection from the sun). However, the ones relevant here are those which have a mixed ontological status. In other words, those creatures, like centaurs, who are half human and half animal, half in nature and half in culture.
In co n trast to th e ir su b se q u e n t tech n o lo g ical c o u n te rp a rts, such c re a tu re s, though anomalous, are not threatening to the relation betw een nature and culture because their bodies, while they have a mixed status, are always consistent. Thus, in the case of centaurs, they are always horses on the bottom and humans on top. Such consistency renders the m onster non-threatening because it observes the stability o f the n a tu re /c u ltu re divide. These monsters are able to be understood, taxonomized, domesticated, 'gentled'.
An im portant indicator of the gentling of the m onster is its ability to engender children, thus rendering it non-singular. Who, for instance, could fail to respond to the cuteness of the baby centaurs in W alt Disney's Fantasial The concept is a fundam entally comforting one.
The fascination with the m onstrous and the place o f the body in culture, as well as the ambivalence about its status, reaches a kind of zenith in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. F ran kenstein's creature is a piece of nature created in culture. T he violation which the young scien tist thus accom p lish es is an ab o m in a tio n p u rely b e cau se n a tu re , im bued with secularized spirituality by R om anticism , has b een su p e rse d ed by cu ltu re in its most im portant and mysterious function -the creation of life.
This text is thus crucial not only as a culm ination to a particular tradition of views of the monstrous, but also as the precursor to the preoccupation of the technological age with the intersection of science and knowledge in the body. It is this consideration which makes Frankenstein so widely regarded as the first work of science fiction (hereafter SF).
Technology and the body
For as long as it has been a part of culture, technology has held a special fa.scination for its admirers and detractors alike. Like monstrosity and thought on the body, it is a fascination in the proper sense -a fascination that is rooted in ambivalence towards its objects. These fascinations come together in what is one of the most characteristic, and certainly one of the most prevalent, objects of technological intervention -the hum an body. The body and technology intersect in most of the so called 'hard sciences', obviously including medicine but extending to include genetics, prosthetics, artificial intelligence and so on. Victor Frankenstein was consum ed with what, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, must have seem ed the ultim ate possibility -that science and technology could create life.
In a famous passage in "Civilization and Its Discontents", Freud (1985:279-280) addresses the possibilities technology presents humanity, and points to the psychical needs technology might fill:
W ith every to o l m a n is p erfecting his ow n organs, w h elh e r m o to r o r sensory, o r is rem oving th e lim its to th e ir functioning. M o to r p o w er p la ces g igantic fo rces at his dispo sal, w hich, like h is m uscles, he c a n e m p lo y in an y d ire c tio n ; th a n k s to sh ip s a n d a irc ra ft n e ith e r w a te r n o r a ir ca n h in d e r his m o v e m en ts; by m e an s o f sp ectacle s he c o rre c ts d efcc ts in th e lens o f his ow n eye; by m e an s o f the te le sc o p e h e secs in to th e far d ista n ce; and by m e an s o f th e m icro sco p e h e ov erco m es th e Umits o f visibility set by th e s tru c tu re o f his retin a. In th e p h o to g ra p h ic c a m e ra h e h as c re a te d an in stru m en t w hich re ta in s th e fle etin g visual im p ressio n s, ju s t as a g ra m o p h o n e disc re ta in s th e eq u ally fleeting a u d ito ry o n es; b o th a rc at b o tto m m a te ria liz a tio n s o f ... his m e m o ry ... . T h e se th in g s th a t, by his science an d technology, m an has b ro u g h t ab o u t on th is e a rth , o n w hich h e first a p p e a re d as a feeble an im al o rganism ... a re a fuinim ent o f every -o r of alm ost every -... w ish ... . M an has, as it w ere, b e c o m e a kind o f p ro s th e tic G o d . W h e n he p u ts on all his auxiliary o rg a n s h e is tru ly magniH cent, b u t th o se org an s have not grow n o n to him and they still give him m uch tro u b le at tim es.
Freud's extraordinarily prophetic words focus on the view that technology is an extension of the body, a tool in the body's service. But the functionality of technology is a double-edged sword -its powers far exceed what the body is capable of, and in its superiority to bodily instrum entality it presents the th reat which Freud implicitly speaks to, the th reat which Frankenstein and a long line of dystopian and technophobic SF w arns against. This is nothing less than the extinction of nature by culture, technology run ram pant in a future which would render the human body redundant, and with it the fragile enculturated identity of Freud's "feeble animal organism". Man might indeed "become a kind of prosthetic God", but the "auxiliary organs" technology provides for the attem pt might replace the originals.
At the root of humanity's fascinated ambivalence with the body and technology is thus, on th e one hand, w hat F reud (1984:315) rightly points to as the d eath drive, "an untiring impulsion towards further perfection" which manifests itself as the project to eliminate the error, failure and inconsistency the body, if it is human, is by definition subject to. On the other hand is the much less palatable possibility that the body as the locus of subjectivity and experience might become superseded.
It is the la tte r possibility which is explored by SF, a g enre which explicitly deals with possible rather than actual events and objects. SF, in representing future possibilities, has long dealt with the kinds of changes technology might bring to bear on the body.
R obots and cyborgs
SF provides us with a particularly focused form of the 'body problem ' in one of its favourite and most durable them es -the robot. For the purposes of this argum ent, I wish only to focus on the classical statem ent of SF's attitude to the robot rath er than attem pt to trace the history of the theme. That statem ent is Isaac Asimov's 'T hree Laws of Robotics', drawn up in the so-called 'golden age' of SF. These 'laws' are as follows: no robot may allow a hum an being to come to harm ; a robot must obey orders given by hum an beings, except where such orders conflict with the first law; and a robot must protect its own existence as long as this does not conflict with the first or second laws.
T he influential T h re e Laws^ illu stra te perfectly w hat th e increasin g p o ssibilities of tw entieth century technology put at risk -humanity. T he Laws ensure th at robots are servile to humans in stable and essential respects. T hus SF is here envisioning a future w here a m anifest danger to hum ans might com e from robots, a technophobic outlook predom inant in S F s view of the technology/body intersection. The trajectory of this fear culm inates in the figure of the cyborg, the cybernetic organism which is the first to fully dram atize the human form as being of mixed ontological status. As Istvan Csicsery-Ronay puts it in a recent article (1991:395):
H isto ric a lly , th e cy b o rg h as s to o d for th e ra d ic a l a n x iety o f h u itia n c o n s c io u sn c ss a b o u t its ow n e m b o d im e n t at the m o m en t th a t e m b o d im e n t a p p e a rs m o st fully co n tin g e n t. C y b o rg an x iety h as s to o d for a p an ic o scillatio n b etw e en th e "hum an" e le m e n t (a sso c ia te d w ith affectio n s, e ro s, e rro r, inn ovations, p ro je cts beg u n in th e face o f m o rtality ) an d th e "m achine" e le m e n t (th e d esire fo r long life, h ea lth , physical im p erm e ab ility , self-co n tain e d c o n tro l p ro cesses, d ep e n d ab ility , an d hencc th e ability to fulfil p rom ises over a long te rm ). T h e cla.ssical S F cybo rg is [thus] a site o f pan ic psychology T hus, 'cyborg anxiety' re su lts from tech n o lo g ical in te rfe re n c e with w hat F reu d ian psychoanalysis would see as the constitution of a 'norm al' human subject in society, which takes as fundamental the appropriate sexual organizations of the body.
The figure of the cyborg, then, represents the radicalized culm ination of SF's appropriation of the theme of the body, and presents the intellectual and evaluative consequences of the changed ontological and psychological status of the body which technology appears to make possible.
In Jam es C am ero n 's SF film s The Term inator (1984) and its sequel. Term inator II ■ Judgment Day (1991), the central figures are killer cyborgs, 'term inators', whose relentless quest is to kill the m other of the person who will lead hum an resistance to a future world order run entirely by machines. The dystopian scenario gives am ple ground for a panic response. The term inator cyborgs o f these films are representative of the body problem which this p ap er has sketched and w hich 1 have co nsequently called 'th e term in a to r syndrome'.
The term inator syndrome
In the first Terminator film, a cyborg is sent back through tim e to kill the m other of John Connor, the human who will lead resistance to the rule of the machines in a dystopian post holocaust future.
The human resistance sends back a soldier to protect Sarah C onnor from the cyborg. It is this soldier, who, before he dies protecting Sarah from the term in ato r, im pregnates her with the son who will grow up to save his m other before he is conceived. TÍie term inator cyborg, played by a typecast Arnold Schwarzenegger, is a 'classical' cyborg, a titanium alloy com bat endoskeleton covered with living hum an tissue. In the course of the film, the human tissue gradually strips away due to shootings, car accidents, and so on, to reveal the naked and malevolent machine beneath (this process includes a famous sequence in which the cyborg, effecting self-repairs on its damaged body, inserts a scalpel into and removes its hum an eye, a la Dali and B unuel's 'A ndalusian Dogs'. W ith the kind of dark wit which ch aracterizes bo th films, the cyborg then dons a p air of shades with the brand nam e 'gargoyles']). T he cyborg revealed as machine seems, as the soldier, R eese, tells Sarah C onnor, to have no capacity for fear, pity or rem orse. The difference betw een human outer appearance and machine inner reality reveals the cyborg as 'really' a machine, and thus reveals its violation of the stable in n er/o u ter distinction which is one condition of a natural body.
The second Terminator film, m ade seven years after the first, sets out to confront a much more subtle set of technologically-posed problems. Here, the machines in the future have again sent back a term inator to kill John Connor, who is now about ten years old. This term inator, however, is an advanced prototype, the T-1000. TTie humans send back an old model term inator (again played by Schwarzenegger) to protect the young John Connor. T he T-1000 is strictly speaking not a cyborg at all, but a robot, since it has no hum an components. It is m ade of a 'mimetic polyalloy', a sort of liquid metal which can imitate exactly any hum an form it has contact with. W hile it has no hum an com ponents, the capacity of the T-1000 for im itation m akes it much m ore threatening to the ontological status of the hum an than the cyborg pro p er, the Schw arzenegger m odel. M ark Dery (1992:103) specifies the nature of the threat:
T h e T-lOOO's quicksilver quality speaks loudly ... o f m ercury, a lu n a r, m u tab le e le m e n t asso ciated w ith a n d ro g y n y a n d h e rm a p h ro d itis m . It has been suggested previously in this paper that the enculturated body requires a zoned sexuality and the o peratio n of taboos. It is these factors which m aintain the balance between the instinctual life of the natural body and the subjection to laws of the encultured body.
The T-1000 robot, by ignoring this frail distinction and changing with equal facility and b elievability from m ale to fem ale and back, th re a te n s p e rh ap s th e m ost im p o rtan t condition of the body in culture -that is, the relation of origin to end product, the infant becoming the properly oedipalized adult.
SF, technology and the cinema
T he T -1000 goes through many radical changes in its a p p e a ra n c e in th e course of Terminator II -Judgment Day. The T-1000 robots are effected by a com puter graphic technique called 'morphing', which is a computerese contraction of metamorphosis.
The powerful affect generated by the special effects technology in both films, but especially the morphing technique in the second, might be seen to have two causes. Firstly there is the very potent illusion of reality achieved by cinema through its fundam ental technologyevery second, twenty four frames of celluloid run through a light shooting through a lens. The affective and psychoanalytic dimensions of this technology are fruitfully discussed by theorists like Stephen H eath and Christian Metz.2
Its effect is to m ake w hat is re p re se n ted on th e screen ap p aren tly occur in th e sam e dimensions and space-time fram e as reality. T he use o f special effects produces a spotty reputation and an easy critical target for the films which use them because they stretch this illusion of reality to its breaking point. Seen in an alternative light, the use of such special effects technology can be said to be simply m ore honest than films which eschew them in the service of realism, since the affect of the cinema is always a manifestly 'imaginary' one. The second cause of the powerful affect of the morphing technique, and the reason why SF films are on such intim ate terms with special effects technology, therefore, comes from the fact th at both SF and FX^ are com m itted to m aking th e possible actu al. T he affect g e n e ra te d by m o rp h in g is b ec a u se it a c tu a liz e s, b e fo re th e v iew e r's very eyes, a technological body being, strictly speaking, perverse -that is, polym orphous or at least 'polygendered'. The morphing technique thus enacts both the failure of the nature/culture divide and the trium ph of its own technology as affective spectacles (though, in this case, silvered rather than rose-coloured). Haraway sees in the SF vision of a cyborg culture reason for hope in that it will liberate hum anity from its enslavem ent to the pow er stru ctu res an oedipalized body fits intostructures of capitalist production and patriarchy.
H araw ay and other p ostm odernists like Jean B audrillard (1991) m aintain th a t such a scenario is upon us already in contem porary culture -the culture, as Baudrillard has it, of simulacra and hyperreality.
It is ironic then that a vast and sophisticated technological arm atu re is used by a major event in co n tem p o rary p o p u la r c u ltu re -th e second Term inator film -in o rd e r to recuperate the category of the hum an in the face of a su p erio r technology. T h e first Terminator film left the term inator cyborg destroyed, but humanity facing an uncertain and probably apocalyptic future. In the second film, the vision of the fu tu re 's possibilities 2 S ee, for ex a m p le, Q iicslions o f C in e m a (1980) by H e a th a n d 7 7 « Im a g in a ry S ig n ifier (1 9 7 5 ) by M etz. F X : S pecial effects seems to increase in rosiness for humanity in inverse proportion to the superiority o f the film's technology. A major subtext in the film is the oedipalization of the Schwarzenegger term in ato r by the young boy John C onnor. T he term inator is program m ed to develop human responses the longer he has contact with humans. The boy teaches the cyborg even to respond jokily to him, a major feat for an entity presumably w ithout an unconscious in the usual sense.
As the boy's m other watches the child becom e fath er of the cyborgian man, she muses ironically that the term inator is the perfect father for the boy, one who would "never get drunk and hit him, would always be there for him", and that of all the men who had drifted through her life this was the best proposition. A t the end of the film, in order to destroy the com puter technology contained in its body which might give rise to a disastrous future for humanity, the term inator sacrifices itself nobly in a vat of molten steel. Sarah Connor reflects that "if a m achine can learn the value of hum an life, maybe we can, too". It is a message of com fort to humanity, faced with the prospect of obsolescence, in which the category of the human is recuperated by making it transcendentally valuable.
Conclusion: Who gets term inated, really?
In the Terminator //, therefore, the only good machine is an oedipalized one, who can be a father and learn the value of human life -a vision not very different from Asimov's Three Laws. C ontrary to the view of postmodernism therefore, humanity, under ever-increasing pressure from technology, still seems to want a body that's alive and kicking. Vista University (Daveyton)
